Phoenix Foundation: Appointment of an Emergency Supervisor

Before validators vote, the “community” should see who decides where their voting power comes from.

The numbers (Terra block 23,401,494, 22 October, 11:08 UTC)

41.3% of Terra’s voting power, 126.5M of 306.4M LUNA, is staked with validators either by Stewardship DAO votes or by ERIS.

  • 30.9% is VT staked through the Alliance module by the Phoenix treasury (11.1%) and four TLA connector contracts (19.8%). All five stake the same 25 validators in identical proportions. Stewardship proposals A4 to A6, A20 and A21 placed it, and 12 redelegation proposals since (A61 to A218) moved it. Philipp proposed all 17. Each passed with three or four Director votes, and every Director voted for some of them.
  • 10.4% is the stake behind ampLUNA, which follows ERIS’s vAMP gauge. ERIS’s docs list Philipp as CEO. About 65% of all ampLUNA is held, directly or through pool shares, by the community’s liquidity multisig, funded with 30M LUNA by proposal 4844. Most of the stake ERIS directs is the community’s own LUNA.

For comparison, quorum is 30% of voting power and the veto threshold is 33.4% of votes cast. Rose has pointed to Terra’s Nakamoto coefficient of 7 (topic 33). That counts validators. Counted by who decides where stake goes, the Stewardship alone places 30.9%, and with ERIS 41.3%.

Who depends on it

  • 25 validators hold Stewardship VT or ERIS ampLUNA stake. For 21 of them it is more than half their voting power, and those 21 hold 47.7% of all voting power. They include five of the ten largest validators, among them the largest, Smart Stake (69%).
  • Two of the 25 are linked to Directors: ERIS, whose operator key is the wallet Philipp lists as his own (99% of its power from these sources), and SCV-Security, Vini’s company (84%). I found no validator linked to Rose or MB.

Why it matters for this vote

The Directive makes validators the final check on it: “Terra stakers and validators have the ultimate decision or veto power” (topic 45). Yet the Stewardship decides where almost a third of the stake those validators vote with sits, and ERIS another tenth.

That is a structural conflict of interest, whatever anyone intends.

I’m not alleging any threat or inducement. But for those 21, a no vote is weighed against the stake behind most of their voting power and commission. The same applies to Vini’s validator as to Philipp’s.

About 9.8% of the VT table still sits with two validators that are jailed and unbonded. Concerning on it’s own for lack of management.

This proposal should fail in it’s current form and should be posted on chain with a remit to review the adherence to the bylaws and actions of all Directors.

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