Philipp’s removal and a three-month plan for Phoenix Foundation Stewardship Path Forward

[Seb]

This draft seeks support for Philipp stepping down as a Phoenix Foundation director and Stewardship Multisig member, alongside a three-month plan to restore accountable governance.

The community is already working on solutions. I believe this proposal offers a better path than a full pause in Phoenix Directive Alliance reward funding, as discussed in the suspension thread: a leadership change, controlled spending and clear commitments against which the community can judge progress.

Why Philipp should step down

• Misrepresenting the voting outcome. A272 proposed removing another director and changing the multisig from 3-of-4 to 2-of-3. It failed with two Yes votes, one No and one director not voting. Philipp described this as a “2–2 deadlock” and subsequently pursued Proposal 4853. His own forum post records the distinction.

• Dismissing safeguards against concentrated control. Asked for a binding safeguard preventing him and another director from becoming sufficient authority alone, he replied, “I couldn’t care less about such a clause.” His offered off-chain voting commitment retained an exception for appointing new directors, leaving control over future membership unresolved. Source.

• Presenting scrutiny as personal victimisation. In the attached Discord exchange, Philipp publicly alleged a death threat and suggested excluding a validator while acknowledging the sender’s clarification that the message did not refer to personal harm. The displayed message concerned code review and contract control. In my view, this was an attempt to cast himself as the victim while shifting attention away from the governance concerns being raised.

• Failure to build confidence in an open process. A validator’s published explanation for changing to No With Veto cited restricted discussions, suppressed communications and rejected requests for inclusive debate. These concerns require a public response and scrutiny of every director’s relevant conduct.

Taken together, this conduct has undermined the trust required of a director. Past contributions do not excuse inaccurate communication, dismissed safeguards or attempts to exclude critics.

Requested action and path forward

If approved through Terra governance, the community would request that:

1. Philipp leave both roles. He should resign as a director and multisig member. If he declines, the Foundation should pursue removal through the applicable procedures.

2. Directors keep essential operations moving. Submit critical operational, existing-obligation and transition proposals to the Stewardship DAO for recorded votes. Pause new discretionary grants during the transition.

3. Multisig safeguards remain unchanged. Preserve the existing approval-percentage and voting-weight settings, making only the necessary membership updates. Publish the resulting configuration.

4. Stewardship expand to five or six directors. Appoint enough eligible candidates to reach that total after Philipp’s departure, following open nominations, community discussion, conflict disclosures and completed KYC.

5. A clear plan be published within 30 days of governance approval. Include priorities, responsibilities, treasury funds, obligations, budgets and measurable milestones, with monthly progress updates.

Three months after approval, the Foundation should publish its results against these commitments for community review. If progress is inadequate, the community may propose a temporary suspension of Alliance reward funding through a separate governance vote.

This is a forum draft for a non-executable text proposal. Implementation must follow the Foundation’s governing documents and applicable procedures. Feedback and a response from the Foundation are invited before on-chain submission.

Supporting screenshots taken from Validator Discord and Terra Telegram:

Validator statement explaining its veto vote and concerns about restricted debate.

The disputed death-threat allegation, displayed message and sender’s clarification.

Additional context: concerns about ampLUNA voting, including Philipp’s statement that ERIS had voted Abstain and did not control the final vote.

Victimisation attempts suggesting validators were pressing Eris for a vote despite reality being completely the opposite

Further reports from the community and how communication happened

Further references: A272, Emergency Supervisor discussion, Proposal 4853, Irregularities, Payments, Terra Telegram, Terra Validator Discord.

[terra1hr7svdp2rga9vf3ry95sx7g5wyspgwmg94qac8]

I support the open nominations, spending controls and published Treasury plan.

These should apply regardless of who remains on the board. Before submission, please clarify the transition: retaining 75% means unanimity with three directors, four approvals with five, and five with six.

How will recusals, appointments and essential payments work? The plan should also address the outstanding contract handover and specify what happens if commitments are missed before the three-month review.

[Lorddonkeykong]

Simple NO with Veto to this prop.

[Seb]

Thanks! Care to elaborate?

[Lorddonkeykong]

Why would you want to chase away basically the only person that meaningfully contributes and develops terra?

[terra1hr7svdp2rga9vf3ry95sx7g5wyspgwmg94qac8]

I want 0xphilipp to keep building useful products for Terra and be paid fairly for that work.

It asks who independently approved payments, who accepted the work, and what happened to the promised contract handover. Those questions apply to every director and funded team.

[Seb]

Contribution can still happen, it does not need a director role for such. This prop asks for his resignation or removal, not asking to remove from Terra community since only Phillip himself can decide.

[Seb]

Agreed. The safeguards should apply regardless of who stays.

The 75% threshold remains unchanged: 3-of-3 during the transition, then 4-of-5 or 5-of-6. Directors should nominate candidates for public discussion and an on-chain community vote.

Essential operations means chain maintenance, security and necessary existing obligations. Before submission, we need a workable process for recusals and blocked votes.

The plan should include contract-handover deadlines and prompt reporting of missed commitments. The community can seek a funding-suspension vote before the three-month review.

This is still a forum draft; those details need settling before submission.

[Lorddonkeykong]

Can any of you make any suggestions for a candidate more qualified and proven track record to lead terra and put on the PF? please don’t suggest Vegas or Raider..

[Raider]

I also support the open nominations, spending controls and published Treasury plan.

It is my view that the board should first be expanded to 7 members with a 5 of 7 multisig threshold before the question of any board removals is considered. I also think all board members should have the right to properly explain themselves and justify past actions where questions exist on those decisions.

I would also like to see essential payments handled through chain governance whilst this transition in the board composition is underway, which is why I support a temporary pause in the Alliance funding of the foundation until the expanded board is in place.

[Raider]

You have no need to worry - foundation director is not a role I am either qualified for, nor want. Besides, I’m too busy enjoying my retirement

[cryptobull]

The Cost of Removing a Builder: Why This Proposal Gets the Diagnosis Right but the Treatment Wrong

You are right to ask hard questions about governance. The concerns raised in the proposal are not imaginary. Vote tallies need to be described accurately. Safeguards against concentrated control need serious answers, not dismissive ones. Every director should face scrutiny when validators raise process concerns.

But here’s the thing. This proposal treats a governance dispute as grounds for removing the one person who has shipped the most working code and live protocol infrastructure on Terra 2.0. That trade is bad for the Foundation and worse for the chain. You don’t fix a governance problem by grounding your lead engineer.

What Philipp Actually Built While the Governance Fight Raged

Look at the record. Not the forum threads. The deployments.

Philipp is the uploader and operator behind ERIS, Creda, and Votion on Terra. These are not side experiments. Creda Finance is the lending hub that lets you supply LUNA and ATOM, earn lending yield, and borrow stablecoins against your position. Eris Protocol runs liquid staking and the Terra Liquidity Alliance, the infrastructure that keeps DeFi liquidity moving across Cosmos. The Liquidity Alliance itself depends on this stack. You deposit collateral into Creda, borrow LUNA, mint ampLUNA through Eris, and pair it into the Alliance pools. Remove the person running that pipeline and you don’t remove a director. You remove a load-bearing wall.

Solid and Capa sit in the same picture. Phoenix Foundation approved funding for six Terra projects, and Solid/Capa is one of them. The Solid team publicly backed the Foundation’s 28.5 million LUNA POL deployment because the integration mints SOLID and deepens the exact liquidity pools the Alliance needs. That proposal went from forum draft to on-chain execution under Philipp’s authorship. The result: roughly 28.5 million LUNA, about 15% of the Community Pool, converted into protocol-owned liquidity on Astroport. That is real treasury deployment with a real flywheel design: fees cycle back into LUNA, reinvested above one dollar and burned below it. You don’t hand that kind of operational continuity to a three-month transition committee and expect the flywheel to keep spinning.

And the network work. Philipp initiated the Terra V2.10 upgrade proposal. That upgrade moved the Alliance module from V0.3.2 to V0.3.5 and fixed multiple Alliance reward distribution errors. Terra’s own communication thanked Philipp of Eris Protocol for assisting with the fix. He also put forward the permissioned CosmWasm upload framework that whitelists established Terra protocols including Astroport, ERIS, Creda, Votion, Solid, and Openfields while reducing the attack surface from malicious contract code. These are chain-level changes. They require someone who knows the codebase, knows the validators, and knows how to move a governance proposal from draft to execution without breaking live contracts. That skill set is not on a hiring requisition you fill in thirty days.

The Three-Month Plan Has a Philipp-Sized Hole in It

Read the proposal’s own mechanics. Directors keep essential operations moving. Critical proposals go to the Stewardship DAO for recorded votes. New discretionary grants pause. Stewardship expands to five or six directors. A clear plan publishes within thirty days covering priorities, responsibilities, treasury funds, obligations, budgets, and measurable milestones.

Now ask the operational question. Who writes the technical proposals during those thirty days? Who reviews the contract changes? Who coordinates with Astroport, Eris, Creda, Votion, and Solid on the liquidity deployment already in motion? The proposal assumes these functions continue. It does not name the person or team that performs them. You are removing the director who has been the uploader and operator for the protocols that depend on Foundation decisions, and you are replacing him with a governance process that has not yet been staffed.

This is not a small gap. The Liquidity Alliance is not a passive treasury position. It requires active management, parameter adjustments, pool rebalancing, and coordination with borrowing and lending markets. Creda is a live lending market. Eris runs liquid staking derivatives that touch validator economics. Votion is part of the same operational footprint. Every one of these systems has a governance surface, a contract surface, and a counterparty surface. Philipp has been the common thread across all three. A three-month stewardship plan that does not address that thread is not a plan. It is a hope.

Accountability Does Not Require Removal From Technical Work

Here is where the proposal makes a strategic error. It bundles two separate questions into one vote. Question one: should Philipp face consequences for how he communicated about the vote, handled the safeguard discussion, and characterized the Discord exchange? Question two: should the Foundation lose its most active technical operator during a live liquidity deployment and a protocol expansion phase?

You can answer yes to the first and no to the second. Nothing about accountability requires stripping a director of every operational role at once. The Foundation can censure conduct, require a public response to the validator concerns, and tighten conflict disclosure rules without handing the keys to Creda, Eris, Votion, and the Alliance to an interim body that has not demonstrated it can run them.

The proposal itself contains the alternative. It asks for a published plan with measurable milestones and monthly progress updates. It preserves the existing multisig approval percentages and voting weights, making only necessary membership updates. Those are accountability mechanisms. Use them. Add a binding conflict-of-interest policy that covers every director’s positions in TLA, Votion, and Eris, not just Philipp’s. Require recorded votes on every operational proposal. Publish the treasury and obligation ledger. If the concern is concentrated control, the answer is transparent process and distributed authority, not decapitating the technical layer and hoping the protocols run themselves.

The Chain Bears the Cost of This Experiment

Terra 2.0 is not a chain with infinite second chances. The Community Pool is roughly 189 million LUNA including recovered funds, and the POL deployment put about 15% of it to work. That capital is now in liquidity pools that require management. Creda, Eris, Votion, and Solid are live applications with users, collateral, and governance polls running. The Alliance module just went through a rewards distribution fix. Every one of these systems benefits from continuity, not a three-month governance experiment that sidelines the operator who built the pipeline.

You asked what Luna has done under Philipp. The answer is in the deployments. Creda. Eris. The Liquidity Alliance. Votion. Solid and Capa. The V2.10 upgrade. The permissioned upload framework. The 28.5 million LUNA POL flywheel. These are not abstract contributions. They are running code and deployed capital. Removing the person who ships them does not restore trust. It transfers risk to users who never asked for this fight.

Reject the removal. Keep the accountability. Demand the disclosures. But do not confuse punishing a director with protecting the chain. The chain needs builders more than it needs a clean org chart.

[Lorddonkeykong]

Once again very well said, removing the most active skilled developer should be strongly opposed. Anything long time LUNC community member that have zero track record of delivery anything at all should get a no with VETO. This kind of toxicity should not be tolerated.