Having considered the discussion and the relevant provisions of the bylaws, I believe the community should reconsider whether appointing a single Emergency Supervisor is the most appropriate approach, given the seriousness of the situation and the potential consequences of this appointment.
Article 2.6.1 expressly allows for the appointment of one or more Emergency Supervisors. I therefore believe the proposal should be amended to provide for at least three genuinely independent Emergency Supervisors, rather than placing such significant responsibility and influence in the hands of one individual.
This is an important decision for the Foundation and the wider community. Regardless of anyone’s personal reputation or existing relationships, placing so much responsibility in the hands of a single person creates a concentration of influence that could be avoided. A small group of independent individuals would offer a better opportunity for balanced judgement, different perspectives and appropriate scrutiny.
I would also ask that an open application process be established.
Rather than selecting a specific individual or presenting the community with a predetermined choice of candidates, anyone from the community who meets clearly defined eligibility criteria should have the opportunity to apply. Each candidate should publish their relevant experience, proposed approach and compensation requirements, together with any professional, financial or other relevant relationships that could reasonably be perceived as affecting their independence.
The community should have the opportunity to review these applications, ask questions and assess the candidates before voting. The selection process should be transparent, with the same requirements and standards applied to everyone.
A person may be well regarded, experienced and trusted by many community members, and those qualities should certainly be considered. However, reputation alone cannot replace transparency. We may know that someone is a good person or has made valuable contributions, but that does not necessarily mean we know the full extent of their relationships, affiliations or potential conflicts of interest. These matters should be disclosed and assessed openly rather than left to assumptions.
The mandate of the appointed Supervisors should also be clearly defined, including their powers, compensation, reporting obligations, decision-making arrangements and the process for resolving disagreements. The community should understand how the Supervisors will operate collectively and how their independence will be maintained throughout the appointment.
The investigation itself should establish whether the circumstances satisfy the bylaws’ definition of an Adverse Event, examine the evidence regarding the alleged persistent deadlock, and assess any substantiated concerns about governance, accountability and risk management. All parties should have a fair opportunity to present their positions, and any findings should be evidence-based.
It is equally important to clarify the limits of the Emergency Supervisors’ authority. Article 2.6.2 restricts their ability to remove or replace Directors or direct Board decision-making, while Article 2.4.5.4 addresses the facilitation of removals following an instruction from an Emergency Supervisor. The relationship between these provisions should be explained clearly so that the community understands the powers it is being asked to authorise.
I also believe we should consider what happens after the current emergency has been resolved.
Article 2.6.1 makes clear that Emergency Supervisors are not intended to remain indefinitely. Their appointment should therefore have a clearly defined scope, duration and conclusion, with transparent criteria for determining when the specific Adverse Event has been addressed.
At the same time, resolving the immediate dispute should not prevent the Foundation from improving its longer-term governance and oversight. The investigation could help identify gaps in expertise, accountability or representation that would benefit from being addressed separately.
Where additional expertise or perspectives are needed, the Foundation should consider appropriate ways to bring them in through transparent processes. This could include people with complementary experience in technical security ,markting ,reach, wider ecosystem and community relations. Any permanent supervisory appointment or other ongoing role should be handled separately under the relevant provisions of the bylaws, rather than automatically extending an emergency appointment beyond its intended purpose.
The objective should not be to favour or target any particular Director. It should be to establish the facts, protect the ecosystem, and ensure that any necessary remedies follow a fair, transparent and properly authorised process.
My request is therefore that the current proposal be amended to provide for at least three Emergency Supervisors and that an open, public application process be established before candidates are selected. The community should have a genuine opportunity to evaluate the available candidates rather than being asked to place its confidence in one individual chosen in advance.
This is a significant decision with potentially far-reaching consequences. The selection process must be as robust, transparent and independent as the responsibilities these individuals will be expected to undertake. We should use this opportunity not only to address the immediate situation but also to consider how the Foundation can develop stronger, more decentralised oversight in the future.